The piece from CFR landed in my inbox this morning, and it’s worth your time if you’re running security operations, building programs, or placing the people who do. Twenty-five years past 9/11, the threat picture has fractured in ways that make the early 2000s look almost straightforward. We faced one adversary then; today it’s al-Qaeda franchises, Islamic State branches, Iranian proxies mixing with contract criminals, narco-traffickers now designated as foreign terrorist organizations, and a widening spectrum of domestic actors the FBI calls nihilistic violent extremists. That’s not threat inflation—it’s the environment your teams are operating in.
The drone problem is the most concrete example of the preparedness gap. The FAA documented more than four hundred illegal drone flights over U.S. airports in the first quarter of 2025 alone, and DHS reported roughly one hundred fifty drones per day crossing the southern border during the first half of that year. The technology is cheap, accessible, and proven in Ukraine and the Middle East. Bipartisan counter-drone legislation that would give DHS and Justice the authorities they need has stalled, and the gap between the threat and the response remains wide. If you’re responsible for critical infrastructure or base security, you already know this—but it’s worth noting that the policy layer hasn’t caught up.
What stands out to me is how the recruitment and radicalization model has changed. The Islamic State recruited fifty-three thousand foreign fighters from eighty countries by understanding social media in ways governments didn’t. The digital-native generations ingest content differently, and the algorithms are designed to move people along quickly. Peer-to-peer campaigns weaponize emotion, and the groups that do this well—Islamic State, but not only them—are building narratives faster than we’re countering them. The long memory of Abu Ghraib, Gaza hospitals, and now the U.S. bombing of an Iranian girls’ school that killed one hundred twenty students feeds those narratives in ways that persist across years and borders.
AI is entering the arena in predictable ways. Affiliates are already using it to generate fabricated news content with fake anchors, sharpen targeting, and identify cultural trends and subcultures to exploit. Governments will have more resources to deploy AI for prediction and defense, but the competition is real and the gap between capability and policy is growing. If you’re building a security architecture or hiring the people who will, you’re planning for an adversary that iterates faster than appropriations cycles allow.
The policy backdrop is what concerns me most. Countering terrorism was the seventh sub-bullet in the Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy; it didn’t make the top eight in the Trump administration’s 2025 version and was mentioned once in passing. The 2026 National Counterterrorism Strategy lists narcoterrorists, legacy Islamist terrorists, and violent left-wing extremists but makes only passing reference to state-sponsored terrorism and cyberterrorism and omits far-right extremists entirely. That’s not a threat assessment—it’s a gap in attention at the moment the threat is most diverse.
For those of us placing cleared senior leaders, this matters in a direct way. The organizations we work with—whether defense primes, intelligence agencies, or commercial cyber firms supporting federal missions—are hiring into an environment where the adversary set is wider, the technology is evolving faster, and the policy support is thinner than it was a decade ago. The people who can map that threat picture, build programs that address it, and operate without waiting for consensus are the ones clients ask us to surface. Track record in complex, multi-actor environments is the filter.
There’s a bright spot buried in the CFR analysis: we know more now about why people are drawn to extremist groups and what pulls them away. The knowledge exists, and some of it has been tested over twenty-five years. The problem is that funding has dried up and the interest in managing coalitions or scaling community programs has faded. The European Union built guardrails with its Digital Services Act; we haven’t. That’s a policy choice, and it shapes the operating environment for everyone working these problems.
If you’re building a team, running a program, or advising leadership on what comes next, the takeaway is this: the threat is more diffuse, the technology is more accessible, and the policy layer is less aligned than it was when most of today’s frameworks were designed. The people who succeed in this environment are the ones who can operate across that gap—who understand the adversary, the technology, and the bureaucracy well enough to build something that works anyway. That’s the profile we’re mapping for, and it’s a narrow one.