The piece from CFR landed in my inbox this morning, and it’s worth your time if you’re running security operations, building programs, or placing the people who do. Twenty-five years past 9/11, the threat picture has fractured in ways that make the early 2000s look almost straightforward. We faced one adversary then; today it’s al-Qaeda franchises, Islamic State branches, Iranian proxies mixing with contract criminals, narco-traffickers now designated as terrorist organizations, and a growing domestic extremist problem that includes what the Bureau calls nihilistic violent extremists. That’s not threat inflation—it’s the environment your teams are operating in.
The drone problem is the most concrete example of how far behind the curve we’ve fallen. The FAA documented more than four hundred illegal drone flights over U.S. airports in the first quarter of 2025 alone. The military recorded three hundred fifty incursions at over a hundred bases. DHS told the Senate that roughly one hundred fifty drones per day were detected crossing the southern border during the first half of last year. Bipartisan counter-drone legislation that would give DHS and Justice the authorities they need has stalled. If you’re responsible for critical infrastructure or installation security, you already know the gap between the threat and your ability to respond.
The social media dimension has matured in ways that make recruitment and radicalization faster and harder to interdict. The Islamic State pulled fifty-three thousand foreign fighters from eighty countries by understanding how digital natives consume content and by weaponizing emotion through peer-to-peer campaigns. The kids who’ve grown up entirely after 9/11 process information differently, and the algorithms are designed to accelerate radicalization, not slow it. If you’re building insider threat programs or vetting pipelines, you’re contending with populations shaped by those dynamics.
Iran’s shift to using criminals and gangs instead of trained operatives is worth watching. The tradecraft is sloppier, which has led to failures, but the intent is clear and the target list includes senior U.S. officials. The 2026 conflict has added fuel to narratives that the West is at war with Islam, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure and heritage sites—including the bombing of a girls’ school in Minab that killed one hundred twenty students—will be used for recruitment for years. If you think that war won’t produce new ideologically driven recruits willing to target U.S. and Israeli interests, you’re not paying attention.
AI is entering the fight on both sides. Terrorist groups are already using it to fabricate news content, sharpen propaganda, and identify subcultures to target. Governments will have more resources to deploy AI for prediction and defense, but the gap between capability and implementation is real. The technological competition is intensifying, and if your organization isn’t thinking about how AI changes the threat surface, you’re behind.
What concerns me most is the deprioritization at the policy level. Counterterrorism was the seventh sub-bullet in the Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy and didn’t make the top eight in the Trump administration’s 2025 version. The most recent National Counterterrorism Strategy lists narcoterrorists, legacy Islamist terrorists, and violent left-wing extremists but barely mentions state-sponsored terrorism or cyberterrorism and omits far-right extremists entirely. That’s not a strategy—it’s a gap.
The talent implications are straightforward. Organizations that take the current threat picture seriously will need people who understand drone defense, who can map radicalization pathways in digital environments, who can assess AI-enabled targeting, and who can operate across the seams between foreign and domestic threats. Those people exist, but they’re not sitting on job boards. The cleared talent pool with real operational experience in these areas is thin, and passive candidates with track records in counter-UAS, online extremism, or state-sponsored terrorism programs are getting multiple approaches.
If you’re building or rebuilding a team to address what’s actually coming rather than what we faced in 2001, the search starts with clarity about the mission and honest conversation about the gap between where your program is and where it needs to be. The threat has moved faster than the policy response, and the organizations that close that gap first will be the ones that can attract and retain the people who’ve been doing this work while everyone else was looking somewhere else.